

**00279**

**1962/06/22**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Thomas A. Parrott  
Executive Assistant to the Military  
Representative of the President

SUBJECT : Operational Plan submitted to CIA by  
Rafael QUINTERO Ibarbia for forwarding  
to the Attorney General and General Taylor

REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Record by Thomas A. Parrott dated  
22 June 1962 Subject: Meeting with Cubans

1. Attached herewith are two copies of a Cuban Operational Plan which was prepared by Rafael QUINTERO Ibarbia, one of the participants in the meeting covered by reference memo. This plan was furnished by QUINTERO to our Station in Miami with the request that it be forwarded to the Attorney General and General Maxwell Taylor. It is our understanding from QUINTERO that this plan was outlined to General Taylor at reference meeting and that General Taylor asked that a more detailed plan be submitted in writing.

2. The Agency has reviewed the above-mentioned plan and our feeling is that it is more of a concept of operations than a detailed plan. As a concept of operations it is basically in line with our current thinking which is not surprising in that we have had a close operational association with QUINTERO and have given him a considerable amount of operational indoctrination and training. As an Operational Plan it is deficient in that it treats lightly or ignores the complex policy and operational considerations involved in the covert development and utilization of the required assets.

3. A copy of the attached plan, along with our views on it, has been forwarded to the Attorney General.

Very truly yours,

*Richard Helms*  
RICHARD HELMS  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Attachment: Two copies of Operational Plan

725-  
**SECRET**



(242)

SECRET

OPERATIONAL PLAN

A) Analysis of the Internal and External Situation

The main objective of this plan which will be outlined below is the realization of an internal military organization in Cuba able to organize, produce and instigate a revolt of national character and force sufficient enough to become the initial spark of the final solution which would ruin the Cuban regime, no matter what the nature of this final solution may be.

For the period of about one year, or starting with 17 April 1961, it has proven to be impossible to create a military organization with the aforementioned capabilities through the groups already in existence because these groups are completely and thoroughly infiltrated up to their highest levels, where it has even come to pass that the regime lets them operate at full speed until it considers that they are strong enough already to cause harm and then it picks the right moment to jail all their leaders and key personnel leaving only a small part with adequate communist infiltration so that when they reorganize once more the agents are infiltrated and the same game starts all over again.

This amounts to supporting a vicious circle, in which a military unit is being carefully organized for the period of a year in order to establish an element of force and when the moment arrives that its organization is completed and positive results begin to show, the regime's repression elements take away its basic structure and leave it appendices so that, at the same time while the regime imprisons its enemies when they can become harmful to it, it leaves a source through which it knows that within a few months it will find a new element of active regime opponents.

On the other hand, it is impossible to clean out the organizations while a military element is being established in them. Because of their character, which is overwhelmingly more political than military, it is impossible to eliminate members from within the organization, when some military elements are established.

Let us take the five major organizations in Cuba as a vivid example:

M.R.R., after a year's hard work of military organization, has suffered a raid which leaves it right where it started and without the certainty that the infiltrates is not still now among its free active members.

M.R.P., every organization and reorganization takes them three or four months before they are arrested. They are aware of and sense the infiltration but they do not know where it is.

SECRET



(243)

The last type of team, called C, would be trained and specialized for specific sabotage actions. These teams would be sent out whenever they were summoned to carry out sabotage actions prepared and specified from here.

A plan like that described here would involve the organization and training of a group of no less than 150 men who would be trained together until the moment when they are separated into teams.

This training would last about 75 to 90 days provided we have the facilities. These facilities are not available at the present time and must be made available to us along with the approval of the plan.

A delay of this plan for over 90 days would be harmful to the job to be done because, the more time that elapses inside Cuba without the benefit of effective action, the less will be the cooperation from the internal elements when they are needed.

It is necessary for us to have available suitable sites for this training, the necessary material assets, personnel qualified as instructors, and especially adequate means of transfer so that these teams, once they are trained, can be infiltrated in the shortest possible space of time.

We suggest that permission be granted so that one of our men, who can be trusted wholeheartedly and who has the necessary background, be placed at the same task assigned to the American agents during the entire process of the plan. In other words, we consider it of great importance that one of our men be accepted in the center where all the nets and threads of the plan are being pulled. This man would be ready to comply with any security rule imposed, even if it meant permanent isolation during the entire process, provided he were assured that all messages would pass through his hands and the proposals he would possibly make regarding each specific team would be taken into consideration.

I am certain that this would be of great help for the plan itself, because of the knowledge this man would have regarding the persons living in Cuba, and the great step forward it would be for the infiltrates to learn of such a new working relationship between Cubans and Americans.

The most important point in this plan is that the organizations continue to be supported, as they have until the present time, in order to draw the whole attention of the repressive organs to them, without their becoming aware of this new alternate organization.

#### C) Facilities Required

We emphasize once more that it is necessary to approve this plan along with the facilities in order to carry it out.

SECRET

-6-

We require facilities in order to safely recruit the necessary personnel, especially financially. For example, when any one of us is required to take a trip for any kind of consultation, there is no way of getting the money for the tickets except by borrowing it from personal friends and, naturally, the loan has to be paid back. It is incredible that such things still happen.

Facilities for training purposes are an absolute necessity. With the resources and the sites we have at present we cannot carry out this plan, particularly within the 90-day period proposed here.

Greater facilities are required so that these men, once they are trained, can be transferred to their area of operations. We have some men who, after the end of their training, remain here another two or three months waiting to be infiltrated. In most cases this is so because we lack sufficient equipment to carry out any kind of infiltration.

We suggest that all these facilities be made available to the agent to be put in charge of the plan. Thereby we avoid the chance that the latter could be disturbed or reduced in his functions by the personal viewpoints of other agents.

We suggest also that Tom Chanaff be the agent in charge of this plan because he is, more than anyone else, personally acquainted with the men who would share in the plan and because we are convinced of his efficiency, which has been evident throughout the period he has been our contact.

D) During the period that I will be travelling throughout Latin America (July, August, September) Dr. Ceasar BARO will be available for consultations regarding this plan. Dr. BARO is the MRR representative to the CRC and is in contact with Tom Chanaff.

SECRET

